Summary
This theoretical study challenges the prevailing interpretation that plants actively signal herbivore or pathogen attack through shared mycorrhizal networks. Using evolutionary game theory, the authors demonstrate that honest signalling about attack is rarely evolutionarily stable because it benefits competing neighbours whilst reducing the signaller's relative fitness. The work proposes two more plausible alternatives: unavoidable costly cues that leak information despite the plant's interests, or mycorrhizal fungi themselves monitoring host plants and warning other network members, with empirical approaches outlined to distinguish between these hypotheses.
UK applicability
These theoretical findings have potential relevance to UK agricultural and horticultural systems reliant on mycorrhizal associations, particularly in understanding mechanisms of plant-fungal cooperation in soil ecosystems. However, the study's applicability depends on empirical validation of the proposed mechanisms in UK field and glasshouse conditions.
Key measures
Evolutionary stability analysis of signalling strategies; relative fitness costs and benefits of honest signalling, dishonest signalling, and cue suppression; conditions favouring alternative mechanisms
Outcomes reported
The study used evolutionary game theory to evaluate the plausibility of plant signalling about pathogen or herbivore attack through mycorrhizal networks. The authors identified that honest signalling is rarely evolutionarily stable and proposed two alternative mechanisms: costly cues that plants cannot suppress, or fungal monitoring and warning systems.
Topic tags
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